The latter subdivision also includes those theories of belief that claim that religious language is only metaphorical in nature.This and other forms of irrationalism result in what is ordinarily considered fideism: the conviction that faith ought not to be subjected to any rational elucidation or justification. Here it is understood that dialogue is possible between reason and faith, though both maintain distinct realms of evaluation and cogency.Reason generally is understood as the principles for a methodological inquiry, whether intellectual, moral, aesthetic, or religious.
Some relatively recent philosophers, most notably the logical positivists, have denied that there is a domain of thought or human existence rightly governed by faith, asserting instead that all meaningful statements and ideas are accessible to thorough rational examination.
This has presented a challenge to religious thinkers to explain how an admittedly nonrational or transrational form of language can hold meaningful cognitive content.
Traditionally, faith and reason have each been considered to be sources of justification for religious belief.
Because both can purportedly serve this same epistemic function, it has been a matter of much interest to philosophers and theologians how the two are related and thus how the rational agent should treat claims derived from either source.
This latter strategy has been employed by some Christian existentialists.
Reason can only reconstruct what is already implicit in faith or religious practice.
As such, it is ordinarily understood to involve an act of will or a commitment on the part of the believer.
Religious faith involves a belief that makes some kind of either an implicit or explicit reference to a transcendent source.
Faith, on the other hand, involves a stance toward some claim that is not, at least presently, demonstrable by reason.